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FOREWORD
KAREN KNOP, RALF MICHAELS & ANNELISE RILES*
I
INTRODUCTION: CAVERS’S DOUBLE LEGACY
This issue of Law and Contemporary Problems on transdisciplinary conflict
of laws1 comes on a double anniversary. Seventy-five years ago this year, Law
and Contemporary Problems was founded as Duke’s first law journal by David
Cavers.2 Cavers was a strong proponent of interdisciplinary and empirical
approaches to the law, and, in fact, Law & Contemporary Problems was
founded as an interdisciplinary alternative to traditional law reviews.3 The
journal has since honored this openness to interdisciplinary studies.
Of course, Cavers was not only a proponent of interdisciplinarity; he was
also a leading figure in conflict of laws. In 1933, the same year in which Cavers
inaugurated Law and Contemporary Problems, he published his seminal
“Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem,” one of the cornerstones of the early
legal-realist critique of traditional methods in conflict of laws and still one of the
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This symposium issue grew out of a small workshop organized at the Faculty of Law, University of
Toronto, and a conference held subsequently at Cornell Law School. We warmly thank the
contributors to the issue. This symposium issue has also benefited from the comments and support of
the other participants in these events: Nathaniel Berman, Dan Danielsen, David Fraser, Janet Halley,
Marie-Andrée Jacob, Mitchel Lasser, Alex Mills, Ed Morgan, Sergio Muñoz-Sarmiento, Kunal Parker,
Alain Pottage, Kim Lane Scheppele, Gary Simson, Chantal Thomas, and Joel Trachtman. We draw on
their work here as indicated.
1. Outside the United States, conflict of laws is often called “private international law.” In this
introductory article, we will use the two terms, and the term “conflicts,” interchangeably.
2. See Foreword, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1933); David Cavers, Memorandum to Dean
Miller from David F. Cavers: Suggestions with Reference to the Proposed Duke Law Review (1932);
Proposal Leading To The Creation of Law and Contemporary Problems, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
167 (Spring 1977).
3. See Remarks by David F. Cavers to Duke Students Concerning the Origin of and Vision for Law
and Contemporary Problems, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xxiii–xxvi (Summer 1988); see also Lyman
Brownfield, A Tribute to David Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xvi (Summer 1988); Erwin
Griswold, David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (Summer 1988); Maurice Rosenberg, David
F. Cavers: Champion of Law-Related Social Research, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. vii (Summer 1988);
Albert M. Sacks, David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. v (Summer 1988); Paul Carrington, In
Memory of David F. Cavers, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xii (Summer 1988), as well as the letters
contained in Some Letters from the Dean’s Files, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. xviii (Summer 1988).
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most influential articles written on choice of law in this country.4 The journal
has also honored this legacy in several important issues dedicated to problems
of conflict of laws, beginning in the second year of its existence.5
Cavers’s interest in the interdisciplinary study of law and his interest in
conflict of laws were interconnected. He later wrote of his famous article, “In
Wall Street, financial pillars were collapsing; in Washington, the New Deal was
assailing old constitutional barriers; and in the law schools, the Realists were
emerging. Past doctrines were there to be challenged. I chose choice of law.”6 In
a similar spirit, this symposium brings together the relation between domestic
law and foreign law, encapsulated in the conflict of laws, and the relation
between law and other disciplines, expressed in the focus on interdisciplinarity.
It does so at an important moment, both for conflict of laws and for
interdisciplinarity in law.
Conflict of laws has been relatively dormant for some time. Of course,
scholars continually repeat the mantra that private international law is
becoming ever more important as international transactions are ever increasing,
the same mantra proclaimed by their predecessors in the nineteenth century.
But there is a feeling of staleness to these proclamations, at least for North
America.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on interstate conflict of laws
since its trilogy of cases in the 1980s;8 and its jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law can safely be called erratic and lacking a
firm conceptual basis. More is happening in the lower courts, but annual
reports9 can do little more than map the approaches and criticize the frequently
unsatisfactory opinions. In Canada, the Supreme Court systematically rebuilt
much of private international law in the early 1990s in four decisions concerning
jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, recognition of judgments, and choice of law
in tort.10 However, the Court’s explicit rejection of all governmental-interest

4. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933).
5. See 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (Summer 1935) (Migratory Divorce); 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 427 (Summer 1956) (The Preventive Law of Conflicts); 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 673 (Autumn 1963) (New Trends in the Conflict of Laws); 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. vi
(Winter 1977) (Contemporary Perspectives in Conflict of Laws: Essays in Honor of David F. Cavers);
50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1987) (Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation); 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 1994) (The Hague Conference on Private International Law).
6. David F. Cavers, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 1933–1983 4 (1985).
7. By contrast, one of us argues that Europe is experiencing its own conflicts revolution. See Ralf
Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (2008).
8. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
9. Most recently, Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2007: TwentyFirst Annual Survey, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 243 (2008).
10. See Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4
S.C.R. 289; Amchem Prods. Inc. v. British Columbia Workers’ Comp. Bd., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897;
Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077. See also, e.g., Jason Herbert, The
Conflict of Laws and Judicial Perspectives on Federalism: A Principled Defence of Tolofson v. Jensen,
56 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 3 (1998); Robert Wai, In the Name of the International: The Supreme
Court of Canada and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian Private International Law, 39
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 117 (2001).
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approaches to choice of law in favor of a strict, formal lex loci delicti rule in
tort11 signified a moment of deep disillusionment for many Canadian commonlaw scholars who had hoped to bring the U.S. “conflicts revolution” to private
international law in Canada.12
For a long time, such a feeling of staleness existed in conflict-of-laws
scholarship, too. With some exceptions, the grand theoretical and
methodological projects published in major law reviews had given way to
minute analyses of specific doctrinal problems. More recently, though, the
general trend towards interdisciplinarity has begun to spread to conflict of laws.
Economic analysis has finally reached it. The first wave of writings was largely
by economically oriented scholars in the United States whose background and
main interest lay in other areas of the law and who found conflict of laws to
border on these substantive areas—corporate law, international economic law,
and so on.13 A second wave of work by (often non-U.S.) scholars of conflict of
laws added further doctrinal details of private international law to the economic
modeling.14
The infusion of political-science analyses into private international law has
followed a similar trajectory, though on a smaller scale. For a long time,
invocations of political ideas in the field amounted to little more than sound

11. Tolofson v. Jensen, supra note 10. Although Tolofson did not resolve all issues of choice-of-law
methodology, judges seem to have lost the appetite for them, leaving the approach to these remaining
issues unrationalized and unpredictable. See Vaughan Black, The Continuing Incoherence of Canadian
Choice-of-Law Methodology, in FRAGMENTATION: DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE CANADIAN
COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 338, 344, 346–48 (2006).
12. See Vaughan Black, supra note 11, at 339 (“[I]n years gone by a leading topic of conversation in
law faculty common rooms across the country was choice of law methodology. Times have changed.”);
John Swan, Federalism and the Conflict of Laws: The Curious Position of the Supreme Court of Canada,
46 S.C. L. REV. 923, 948 (1995) (“A judgment written in 1994 that adopts so unequivocally the vested
rights theory of conflicts is so unexpected that it is as if one encountered a practicing alchemist: What
can one possibly say?”). For two telling snapshots of common-law Canada, compare Richard Risk,
Canadian Law Teachers in the 1930s: “When the World was Turned Upside Down,” 27 DALHOUSIE L.J.
1, 13–17 (2004) (using John Falconbridge and Moffat Hancock to track Canadian conflicts scholars’
alliance with the U.S. “conflicts revolution”) with Herbert, supra note 10, at 23 (describing how from a
variety of perspectives, commentators regarded Tolofson as souring conflict of laws in Canada).
13. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (2001); Andrew T. Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883
(2002); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1151 (2000); Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L.
1 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 975 (1994).
14. E.g., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jürgen Basedow &
Toshiyuki Kono eds., 2006); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN 153 (Eckart Gottschalk,
Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., 2007); Giesela Rühl, Methods and Approaches in
Choice of Law: An Economic Perspective, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 801 (2006); Horatia Muir Watt,
Choice of Law in Integrated and Interconnected Markets: A Matter of Political Economy, 9 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 383 (2003); Horatia Muir Watt, Aspects économiques du droit international privé, 25 RECUEIL
DES COURS 307 (2004).
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bites, and empirical research was rare.15 This may be beginning to change, in
view of more-recent theoretical and empirical work.16
Another interdisciplinary approach comes from legal anthropology, and,
more specifically, from theories of legal pluralism. Paul Schiff Berman has
drawn on these literatures to argue for an approach to conflict of laws that is
both cosmopolitan (and thus more open than current approaches to foreign
claims to regulation) and pluralist (and thus open to the designation of nonstate
normative orders as applicable law).17 Gunther Teubner likewise has sought to
draw on conflict of laws to address three core questions of systems theory: the
nature of the conflict between different functional subsystems of society,18 the
nature of the conflict between state law and other “quasi-legal” orders,19 and the
nature of the conflict between different legal regimes, especially in international
law.20
These interdisciplinary approaches are promising, but they still stand
somewhat isolated from each other and from the mainstream, and perhaps the
full potential of interdisciplinarity has not yet been recognized. The goal of this
symposium is to strengthen and deepen the growing interdisciplinary
orientation of private international law. Accordingly, the articles in the
symposium push the boundaries of interdisciplinarity in the field in challenging
and sometimes surprising directions. Many are experimental in nature. Many
bring theoretical and disciplinary perspectives to bear upon conflict-of-laws
issues that have not before been part of the conversation. Many are written by
scholars who do not consider themselves to be primarily conflicts experts. Many
even reframe the goal of conflict-of-laws analysis, from solving judicial disputes
to reflecting on the wider and deeper issues at stake in conflicts problems.

15. An exception is Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277 (1989).
See also the criticism by Hillel Y. Levin, What Do We Really Know About the American Choice-of-Law
Revolution?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 247 (2007) (reviewing SYMEON SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN
CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2006)).
16. See, e.g., Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA.
L. REV. 49–93 (1989); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance: The Politics
of Private International Law (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke Univ. 2007), available at
http://www.law.utah.edu/_personfiles/6580/whytock-dissertation-111607-final.pdf. See also Symeon
Symeonides, supra note 16; Patrick Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992).
17. See Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819 (2005).
18. Gunther Teubner, LAW AS AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 100–22 (Anne Bankowska & Ruth Adler
trans., Zenon Bankowski ed., 1993); Gunther Teubner, De collisione discursuum: Communicative
Rationalities in Law, Morality and Politics, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 901 (1996).
19. See Gunther Teubner, Global Bukowina, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther
Teubner ed., 1997). For a friendly critique from within systems theory, see Ralf Michaels, The True Lex
Mercatoria: Global Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 447 (2007).
20. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004).
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II
THEMES: INTERDISCIPLINARITY
OF CONFLICTS AND CONFLICTS OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY
An interdisciplinary approach opens up two different themes. One is the
familiar insight that other disciplines can both enlighten and enrich; they can
provide new and exciting perspectives on a field. This is true for conflict of laws
as for other legal disciplines, if not more so. The other, less-developed theme is
the value that can come from the ensuing conflict between law and the other
disciplines in question.
Drawing on the articles in the symposium, this introduction surveys existing
approaches to interdisciplinarity in conflict of laws. It distinguishes between an
interdisciplinarity internal to the law that relates conflicts to other legal spheres
and issue areas (II.A), and an external interdisciplinarity that engages nonlegal
disciplines such as economics, political science, and anthropology (II.B). Later
sections outline a number of ways in which the contributors to the symposium
push the interdisciplinary project further: approaching the study of conflicts
through its discourse and imagery (II.C), through the historical and present-day
context of colonialism (II.D), and through ethnographies that detail how its
doctrines are experienced and produced in the real world (II.E). The last
section discusses how these and other interdisciplinary insights yielded by the
symposium might provide a richer and more-productive concept of conflict of
laws (II.F). It goes without saying that although each article appears under one
heading, many of the articles relate to several of them.
A. The Conflict within Conflicts: Public and Private
For much of the twentieth century, private international law has been
subjected to quite radical critique. Brainerd Currie’s exclamation that “[w]e
would be better off without choice-of-law rules”21 is emblematic of a general
concern. One challenge to conflict of laws is internal to the law: the decline of
the public–private distinction. Conceived as specifically private international
law, conflict of laws seemed ill-equipped to deal with conflicts between public
laws, or even with the public aspects of conflicts between private laws.
One possible consequence is critique. If indeed all law is public law, as
standard critiques of the public–private distinction maintain, this must mean
that conflict of laws as private international law is open to the same critique as
was private law before: it assumes a separate private sphere that does not really
exist; it restricts the courts’ adjudicatory power in a way that prevents courts
from effectuating social change; it prioritizes the market over the political
system. Much of the early realist critique of conflict of laws can be viewed in
this light. In the first article in this symposium, Joel Paul, in scrutinizing the

21. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183 (1963).
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recent history of the concept of comity,22 draws on this theme to mount a
scathing critique of private international law. He lays out how comity was
expanded in two ways to restrict the regulatory power of U.S. courts. First,
comity turned from a mere discretionary instrument to a system of virtual
obligations: courts were no longer free, in practice, to determine whether and
when they could defer to foreign law; after the comity revolution they were
reduced to following rules in doing so. Second, Paul argues, comity is no longer
owed merely to foreign laws; now, courts owe similar deference to private
autonomy, to the executive, and even to the global market, as evidenced in the
recent Empagran23 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court establishing the limited
reach of U.S. antitrust law with regard to global cartels.
Such critique need not lead to a rejection of the field. Another response to
the claim that the private is always already public in conflicts would be to bring
choice of law to bear more directly on matters of public law, whether domestic
or international. Indeed, much recent interest in the field seems to be devoted
to such possibilities. In general, the relation of conflict of laws to domestic
public law is being measured anew,24 as is the relationship between public and
private international law.25 Thus, the revenue rule (“no country ever takes
notice of the revenue laws of another”),26 buried doctrinally somewhere within
the much maligned public-law exception to choice of law,27 now makes a
surprise return to the center of the field. Once the embarrassment of a
discipline otherwise proclaiming openness towards foreign law, the rule has
assumed new significance in the context of the global fight against smuggling.28
22. Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19
(Summer 2008).
23. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
24. William S. Dodge, The Public-Private Distinction in the Conflict of Laws, 18 DUKE. J. COMP.
INT’L. L. ___ (forthcoming 2008).
25. At the symposium underlying the present issue, Alex Mills presented his study of the history of
private international law as a subset of international law. Alex Mills, The Private History of
International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1 (2006). See also Ralf Michaels, Public and Private
International Law: German Views on Global Issues, 3 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 121 (2008) (reviewing
VÖLKERRECHT UND IPR (Stefan Leible & Matthias Ruffert eds., 2006)); Symposium, Public and
Private Law in the Global Adjudication System, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 253 (2008). Although
Philip Jessup’s famous 1956 lectures on transnational law are best known for the proposition that the
separate fields of public and private international law be merged in a single new field of “transnational
law,” which would include all law regulating actions or events that transcend national frontiers, Jessup
also emphasized that this would extend choice of law beyond private international law. PHILIP C.
JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2, 106 (1956). See generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738 (Jan M. Smits ed., 2006).
26. Holman v. Johnson, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B.) (per Lord Mansfield).
27. See Jean-Gabriel Caste, The Erosion of the Foreign Public Law Exception: Recent Canadian
Developments, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR T.
VON MEHREN 243 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002); William S. Dodge,
Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161 (2002); Philip J. McConnaughay, Reviving the
“Public Law Taboo” in International Conflict of Laws, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 255 (1999).
28. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4 (2d Cir.
2001); Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 544
U.S. 1012 (2005); Joined Cases T-377/00, T-379/00, T-380/00, T-260/01 and T-272/01, Philip Morris
International, Inc., et al. v. Comm’n of the European Communities 2003 E.C.R. II-1. See also Jürgen
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In public international law, the proliferation of international courts and
tribunals with sometimes overlapping jurisdictions and the growing number of
different spheres of international law and systems of rules applicable to the
same facts have led the United Nations International Law Commission to
propose an “international law of conflicts.”29 Christian Joerges and others have
made the constructive proposal to conceptualize the relationship between
European Union Law and the law of the member states as a conflict of laws.30
And in the current debate over the role, if any, of customary international law
in U.S. courts, several scholars have reached for choice-of-law rules as a middle
ground.31
And yet two articles in this issue demonstrate that the distinction between
public and private does not evaporate quite as easily as some commentators
might wish, nor perhaps should it. Ralf Michaels shows how the public–private
distinction reappears in economic analysis of conflict of laws ostensibly
predicated on abolishing it.32 Karen Knop demonstrates the potential of the
distinction for new and alternative ideas of private as opposed to public
citizenship. 33 In this light, as we argue elsewhere,34 the demise of the public–
private distinction may in fact mean not the death but the growth of conflict of

Basedow et al., Foreign Revenue Claims in European Courts, 6 Y.B. PRIV. INT’L L. 1 (2004); Adrian
Briggs, The Revenue Rule in the Conflict of Laws: Time for a Makeover, 2001 SINGAPORE J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 280 (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=439281; William S. Dodge, supra note 27, at
208–19; Brenda Mallinak, The Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty-First Century,
16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 79 (2006); ED MORGAN, THE AESTHETICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
164–69 (2007). See also Audra Simpson, Subjects of Sovereignty: Indigeneity, the Revenue Rule, and
Juridics of Failed Consent, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (Summer 2008).
29. UN INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM THE DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 at 211 (2006). But compare id. at 8 (presenting a close analogy with conflict of
laws as apt to deal with this fragmentation of public international law) with JOOST PAUWELYN,
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2003) (rejecting the analogy with conflict of laws).
30. See, most recently, Christian Joerges, Integration Through De-legislation? An Irritated
Heckler 13–18 (European Governance Papers No. N-07-03, 2007), available at http://www.connexnetwork.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-07-03.pdf. See also Marc Amstutz, In-Between Worlds:
Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in Legal Reasoning, 11 EUR. L.J. 766 (2004); ANDREAS
FURRER, ZIVILRECHT IM GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTLICHEN KONTEXT—DAS EUROPÄISCHE
KOLLISIONSRECHT ALS KOORDINIERUNGSINSTRUMENT FÜR DIE EINBINDUNG DES ZIVILRECHTS IN
DAS EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2001); Christoph Schmid, Vertical and Diagonal Conflicts in
the Europeanisation Process, in PRIVATE GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
SUPRANATIONALISM 185 (Christian Joerges & Oliver Gerstenberg eds., 1998).
31. See Arthur Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L
L. 1 (1995); Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 365 (2002); see also Beth Van Schaack, Boumediene and Choice of Law (June 13, 2008),
available at http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/13/boumediene-and-choice-of-law/.
32. Ralf Michaels, Economics of Law as Choice of Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73 (Summer
2008).
33. Karen Knop, Citizenship, Public and Private, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 309 (Summer
2008).
34. Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, The Fall and Rise of Private International Law:
From Conflict of Laws to Theory of Private Global Governance (draft presented at the Globalization,
Law & Justice Workshop, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto (Nov. 1, 2007)) (on file with authors).
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laws. For instance, the paradigmatically public question of the status of
prisoners held by the U.S. government at Guantánamo is being reconceived by
some as a matter of private international law, that is, of the territorial reach of
U.S. laws and jurisdiction.35
Whether conflict of laws is methodologically suited to such tasks is often not
discussed in depth. In this symposium, Jacco Bomhoff takes on these
questions.36 He enriches the debate over the extraterritorial scope of application
of human-rights doctrines by connecting it to the doctrine of state action and
also to conflict of laws. What may at first sound like a curious conflation of
three incommensurables yields fascinating insights: The territorial limits on
governmental regulation addressed in the problem of extraterritorial human
rights can be informed by the substantive limits on such regulation addressed in
the state-action doctrine. And the conflict with foreign sovereigns, which the
question of extraterritorial human rights treats as a problem of public law, can
be linked to the conflict with foreign sovereigns regarding the applicable private
law as addressed in the conflict of laws. In Bomhoff’s analysis, the collapsed
public–private distinction is used not as a tool of critique but as a source of
mutual inspiration, even a kind of interdisciplinarity within the law: after the
collapse of the distinction between public and private, conflict of laws can
usefully inform constitutional law, and vice versa.
B. The Conflict between Conflicts and Other Disciplines
The debates surveyed in the previous section concern discussions within the
law. But much recent interest in conflict of laws goes beyond legal doctrine per
se. Some of this interdisciplinary work comes from conflict-of-laws scholars
who, disappointed by traditional methods, or perhaps in search of new things to
say, import approaches from outside the law. Some such work comes from
scholars from other disciplines altogether—economics, political science,
anthropology—who view conflict of laws as a fruitful field for experimentation.
Sometimes, these interdisciplinary approaches amount to little more than
reformulations of traditional approaches in conflict of laws. Sometimes,
however, the new perspectives open new potential for the discipline.
One use of interdisciplinarity currently in vogue seeks to directly translate
insights from other disciplines into substantive legal rules. Unfortunately, the
rules that result from such translations more often than not closely resemble
what already existed before the doctrine. For the example of law and

35. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2005); James Gathii,
Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335 (2003–2004); Kermit
Roosevelt, III, Guantánamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017
(2005). For commentary, see, e.g., Fleur Johns, Guantánamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception,
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 613 (2005); Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional
Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073 (2005).
36. Jacco Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: The “Foreign” and “The Private” in Conflict-of-Laws,
State-Action, and Fundamental-Rights Cases with Foreign Elements, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39
(Summer 2008).
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economics, Ralf Michaels shows in this volume that most new economic
analyses, at least if read as substitutes for legal doctrine, do not yield new and
more objective solutions37 When read as doctrine, they reformulate existing
doctrinal models, reinstating in particular the old standoff in the field between
views privileging governmental interests and views attentive to private interests.
When these analyses are used to resolve specific doctrinal problems—the
applicable law in transboundary torts, the problem of characterization, the
question whether choice-of-law rules should be formulated as rules or
standard—they simply replicate existing doctrinal debates.
On another level, however, such “outsider interdisciplinarity” can help both
to highlight the specific sensitivities and rationalities existing within conflict of
laws and to develop a new, richer and more theoretical, view of the field. Thus,
political-science analyses draw attention to the connection between private
international law and global governance in a way that is largely ignored by
insider experts. At the same time, political science and political theory may
(re)insert a political perspective into a discipline that has long been defined by
technicalities that, ironically, are based on concepts like governmental interests
that once carried enormous political significance. Such studies may also show
the opposite: the political significance of these technicalities within global
governance. If, as Michaels demonstrates in his article, economic analyses
cannot overcome the struggle between public and private conceptions of private
international law, this may suggest how fundamental this struggle is to the field.
Building on this, he shows that economic analysis can highlight what traditional
analysis ignores: the regulatory competition between legal orders, the role of
individuals in shaping this competition, and the dependence, deliberate or not,
of conflict-of-laws norms on the structure of the global legal system. The same
could be said of the effort to reorganize the field of conflicts around debates in
legal pluralism, as Annelise Riles argues in her article.38 If this effort largely
bumps up against familiar problems and, by its own admission, ends up
advocating already familiar doctrinal solutions, the insights of legal pluralism
nevertheless can help develop an understanding of the sensitivities necessary to
deal with the global legal pluralism that characterizes the situation of law in
today’s world.
Robert Wai’s contribution to this symposium39 also engages with legal
pluralism. Writing in the international business context, Wai lauds accounts of
global legal pluralism for their analyses of the growth of multiple normative
orders and their recognition of interlegality, meaning the superimposition,
interpenetration, and mixture of different legal spaces in both mind and action.40

37. See Michaels, supra note 32.
38. Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (Summer 2008).
39. Robert Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107
(Summer 2008).
40. Id. (quoting BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 437
(2d ed. 2002)).
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However, Wai argues that while these accounts serve as an important corrective
to a doctrinal focus on state norms, they overemphasize nonstate normative
orders, for example, insisting on a purely nonstate lex mercatoria
unrecognizable to legal practitioners. For Wai, they also miss the full extent of
their own conception of interlegality. He proposes instead “transnational
private law” as a frame of reference that adds private international law to
private law, thereby reminding us of private law’s concern with relationships
among plural and transnational normative orders, both state and nonstate. Seen
as a decentralized and intermediate form of transnational governance, Wai’s
notion of transnational private law also highlights his own distinct view of
interlegality, which regards a certain degree of contestation and conflict among
normative orders as legitimate.
C. Discourse and Imagery of Conflicts
The true promise of interdisciplinarity, then, is not the mere substitution of
one discipline for another, but mutual enrichment.41 This insight becomes all the
more important if we want to dramatically broaden the range of issues,
questions, theoretical frameworks, methodological approaches, and historical
and cultural contexts in which conflicts problems are analyzed. We believe the
interdisciplinary project can be pushed further to engage a much wider range of
methods and concerns, including, in particular, approaches that are
noninstrumentalist in character, those that do not aim to translate immediately
into technical solutions to doctrinal problems. A broader interdisciplinary
approach—broader by virtue of the fact that it highlights what is left out of
traditional conflicts analysis—demonstrates in concrete and consequential ways
the remarkable ability of conflicts methodologies, whether by courts or by
academics, to make what is often most pressing, most poignant, most
epistemologically challenging and most politically and morally difficult about
particular questions mysteriously vanish from the foreground.
One approach to the cultural study of conflict of laws is to look at discourse
and imagery: to bring intricate techniques of discourse analysis to bear upon the
language of conflicts cases and scholarship. The discourse of conflict of laws can
conceal or highlight important underlying concerns. For example, the regulation
of cyberspace has famously been conceived as a matter of conflict of laws, in
which the state is asked to grant comity to the allegedly autonomous normative

41. For a sampling of views on the meanings and values of interdisciplinarity in the context of
public international law, see David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law and Policy, 12
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1999); Kenneth Abbott, Toward a Richer Institutionalism for International Law
and Policy, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 9 (2005); David Kennedy, The Disciplines of International Law
and Policy, 12 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 9 (1999); Jan Klabbers, The Relative Autonomy of International Law
or The Forgotten Politics of Interdisciplinarity, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 35 (2005); Gerry Simpson,
Duelling Agendas: International Relations and International Law (Again), 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 61
(2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual
Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993).
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regime of the Internet.42 Much of the ensuing debate has dealt with substantive
questions: How different is the Internet, really, or how much deference is
appropriate? Andrea Slane, in her article for this symposium, does not address
these policy questions but instead focuses on the imagery used to define them.43
She dissects the images of globalization at work in conflicts cases involving
harms caused by postings on the Internet and demonstrates how these images
work to produce a coherence for the field of conflicts as well as the nature of
the Internet as a discursive space.
Such discourse analysis bears fruit in other debates as well. For example,
much of the debate on the legality of same-sex marriage in the United States
now takes the form of choice-of-law analysis, a move away from the
constitutional mandate for or against same-sex marriage to the constitutional
mandate of states to recognize marriages entered into in other states.44 It seems
fair to state that for most participants in the debate, conflicts is a mere end
towards a substantive goal: proponents of same-sex marriage propagate the
duty of states to recognize out-of-state marriages; opponents emphasize
doctrinal conflict-of-laws arguments like the public-policy exception against
such a duty. This substantive and instrumental focus has led scholars such as
Gary Simson to argue that the proper space for such debates is not conflict of
laws at all, but substantive law, and most importantly constitutional law.45
Brenda Cossman’s article in this issue takes a very different tack. Cossman
reads the battery of arguments at work in doctrinal debates about the
recognition of gay and lesbian marriages alongside other images of these
migrating marriages in television and film and in wedding announcements in the
New York Times. At a most basic level, this cultural analysis reminds us that
doctrinal efforts to abstract from the substance of disputes aside, substance and,
in particular, cultural and political context continue to matter in ways that are
often both crucial and unappreciated in the discipline. Cossman’s analysis also
shows how the intricate moves of recognition and deference that characterize
technical doctrinal maneuvering in the conflict of laws are actually
consequential for the political substance of debates. The question of same-sex
marriage is in essence one of recognition—not only by other states, but by
publications like the New York Times with its wedding announcements, by
society at large. Even public policy, when invoked against recognition, restricts

42. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1367, 1391–95 (1996).
43. Andrea Slane, Tales, Techs, and Territories: Private International Law, Globalization, and the
Legal Construction of Borderlessness on the Internet, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (Summer 2008).
44. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX MARRIAGES
CROSS STATE LINES (2006). For an (already surpassed) bibliography of articles on the topic, see
William A. Reppy, Jr., The Framework of Full Faith and Credit and Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex
Marriages, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 393, 477–81 (2005). At the conference underlying this issue, Janet
Halley expressed such an outsider’s interest in conflict of laws. See Janet Halley, Traveling Marriage
(June 26, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
45. Gary Simson, Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 313 (2006) (paper presented at the Cornell conference underlying this symposium issue).
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same-sex marriage only in the narrow doctrinal sense. Brenda Cossman uses
Judith Butler’s version of speech-act theory46 to think about what is “sayable”
and not sayable in the language of conflicts. The invocation of public policy,
Cossman shows, is also a speech act, which paradoxically reinforces the
existence of gay and lesbian marriage as a political problem, and recognizes the
validity of a same-sex marriage, even if elsewhere. In this sense, the question of
the enforceability of foreign marriages cannot but be part of a wider, global
cultural conversation—a conversation taking place through global forms of
media as much as through global forms of law and in particular conflict of
laws—about the politics of sexuality.
For Nikitas Hatzimihail, likewise, a close reading of the imagery conflicts
scholars use to describe their own doctrine tells us something important about
the identity of the discipline itself.47 Writing on lex mercatoria, the allegedly
autonomous law of international commerce, Hatzimihail takes as his subject not
lex mercatoria itself or its actual history, but its frequent description as “new” in
comparison to an “ancient” law merchant said to have flourished in medieval
and early modern Europe. He scrutinizes different ways in which history is
invoked to legitimate different twentieth-century notions of lex mercatoria. In
view of the great likelihood that a historical lex mercatoria has always been a
latter-day fabrication, these historiographies gain importance not for the past
but for the present.
D. Conflicts as Colonialism
Although in its doctrines conflict of laws focuses paradigmatically on
similarly situated states or sub-state jurisdictions, many conflicts problems are,
in one way or another, a product of histories or present-day forms of
colonization. Here once again conflicts can benefit from a rapprochement with
public international law. Critical scholars of colonialism working in public
international law have dramatically turned on its head the conventional wisdom
that public international law is a product of European civilization and a tool of
peace. They have shown that public international law in fact evolved principally
out of practical problems associated with colonial domination, such as how to
make sense of, govern, appropriate the resources of, manage, and convert what
is “Other” to the cosmopolitan West.48 Several articles in this issue make a
similar move with regard to private international law.
46. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997).
47. Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: History as Genealogy
in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169 (Summer 2008).
48. See, e.g., ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW? A
REAPPRAISAL OF THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 43–64 (1986);
EVE DARIAN-SMITH & PETER FITZPATRICK, LAWS OF THE POSTCOLONIAL (1999); Nathaniel
Berman, In the Wake of Empire, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1521 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism,
Colonialism, and International Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1013 (2007); Vasuki Nesiah, From Berlin to
Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 75 (2004); Joel Ngugi, The
Decolonization-Modernization Interface and the Plight of Indigenous Peoples in Post-Colonial
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Conflicts doctrines manage political and cultural conflict involving
overlapping and contested forms of sovereignty. Although the dominant view in
the field often treats such conflict as conflict among equal states, in fact much of
this conflict arises out of situations of domination, hegemony, or imperialism. In
doctrinal terms, this is treated as irrelevant. It is just “background” to the
technical doctrinal problem. But this context is often the engine of doctrinal
development, and it is impossible to make sense of the doctrine without
understanding it as a tool of colonization and also, sometimes, as a place of
resistance to colonial authority.49 Joel Paul’s article describes how the doctrine
of comity evolved in intimate relationship to the global debate about slavery in
the nineteenth century.50 Most of the theories of legal pluralism discussed in the
papers by Wai and Riles evolved out of efforts to impose foreign law on
colonial subjects and efforts to integrate law and custom in colonial and
postcolonial states.51
Two articles address these issues head-on. Audra Simpson’s article concerns
conflict-of-laws problems in cases involving the smuggling of cigarettes from the
United States into Canada.52 In R.J. Reynolds, the best known of these cases,53
the Canadian government brought an action in the United States against a
cigarette manufacturer to recover lost tobacco duties and taxes and money
spent on additional law enforcement due to an alleged conspiracy to smuggle
cigarettes into Canada for sale on the black market. The ordinary doctrinal
focus in these cases is the revenue rule as a vehicle for addressing conflict
between two sovereigns—the U.S. and Canada—and between public and
private concerns. Simpson shows how this emphasis blinds us to another,

Development Discourse in Africa, 20 WISC. INT’L L.J. 297 (2002); Ileana M. Porras, Constructing
International Law in the East Indian Seas: Property, Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’
De Iure Praedae—The Law of Prize and Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates,” 31
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 741 (2006).
49. In this vein, see Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 430–33 (2000) (arguing that, contrary
to the assumptions of Northern and Southern scholars alike, international commercial arbitration
should not be viewed as the twentieth-century resurrection of the merchant tribunals of medieval
Europe, but as the functional successor to the imperial-era system of legal capitulations and mixed
courts in the Middle East and elsewhere that helped to consolidate international trade on terms
favorable to European parties).
50. Paul, supra note 22. In the Cornell symposium underlying this issue, David Fraser surveyed and
critiqued the approaches that courts in several countries took in their choice-of-law analysis of the
applicability of German anti-Semitic laws. See David Fraser, “The Forces of Civilization Cannot
Retreat”: The Public Policy Exception, the Nazis and Private International Law (April 7–8, 2006)
(paper presented at Symposium, Rethinking the Private in Private International Law: New Methods,
Cornell Law School) (on file with authors). For further discussion on this topic, see David Fraser, “This
Is Not Like Any Other Legal Question”: A Brief History of Nazi Law Before U.K. and U.S. Courts, 19
CONN. J. INT’L L. 59 (2003). See also DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ: TOWARD A
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLOCAUST (2005).
51. Annelise Riles, Comparative Law and Socio-legal Studies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 775 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2007).
52. Simpson, supra note 28.
53. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 118 n.4 (2d Cir.
2001).
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arguably more-pertinent conflict: the question of Native American sovereignty
and of the colonial history underlying the territorial boundary between the
United States and Canada. R.J. Reynolds involved the St. Regis–Akwesasne
Indian Reservation on the New York border with Canada, yet this sovereignty
question miraculously vanishes from the picture when Native American
movements across state borders become a question of the applicability of the
revenue rule to a dispute about cigarette smuggling. Simpson thus reminds us
that the sovereignty question can reappear once we remind ourselves of what is
at stake in conflict-of-laws disputes. The article highlights the dramatic erasure
of the colonization of North America from disputes concerning the exercise of
Native American treaty rights.
Likewise, Teemu Ruskola shows how the United States Court for China,
created in 1906 and abolished in 1943, was another way in which conflict of laws
figured in the colonizers’ imposition of their own law and values elsewhere.54
Although the court has been described as a legal curiosity—”probably the
strangest federal tribunal ever constituted by Congress”55—Ruskola sets it
against a history of Western powers’ assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction
over their citizens in non-Western countries.56 Tasked with treating China as if it
were part of the United States, the Court fashioned its jurisprudence from laws
including pre-independence American common law, the codes of the District of
Columbia and the Territory of Alaska, and Chinese property law. Ruskola
invokes theories of language, writing, and discourse to analyze both how
American understandings of extraterritoriality make themselves blind to their
own contradictions and their political consequences and how these doctrines
confront, and often suppress, their own political and epistemological limits.
E. Ethnographies of Conflicts
Another approach to conflict-of-laws problems is ethnographic or
interpretive. Rather than analyze the hidden grammar of the language and
imagery of conflicts doctrine, or bring a new body of theory to bear upon
conflicts problems, the interpretive approach paints a rich and revealing picture
of how conflicts doctrines are experienced and produced in the real world. Its
value is that it highlights aspects of ordinary lawmaking that may be so
important and fundamental to the field that they ironically become too

54. Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the
U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (Summer 2008).
55. David J. Bederman, Extraterritorial Domicile and the Constitution, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 451, 452
(1988).
56. For a discussion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the period 1815 to 1939, situating this system
in the context of Western international legal theory and practice of the time, see generally, e.g., GERRY
SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES; UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 227–53 (2004).
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mundane for comment and hence are overlooked by insider-theorists and
doctrinalists.57
Fleur Johns’s article in this issue exemplifies this approach.58 Her article,
informed by both theoretical erudition and experience as a former practicing
attorney,59 gives us a richly textured picture of what “party autonomy,” a
keystone of conflicts doctrine, actually means in the real world—how it is
experienced, enacted, and produced—within the global culture of transnational
dealmaking. Johns’s focus on “the deal” reveals a much richer picture of the
actual exercise of party autonomy than what conflicts doctrine typically
assumes. One of the insights of this approach that is particularly relevant is that
the field of conflicts is not just a set of norms embedded in doctrine but a set of
knowledge practices.60
F. Towards Interdisciplinary Conflicts
The contributions to this symposium suggest that conflict of laws,
understood in its broader implications and context, is far from stale, but can
actually become an exciting site for current debates. Moreover, even if
interdisciplinarity cannot generate directly applicable rules, it can lead to more
informed, richer, more adequate ways of doing conflict of laws.
In her article, Annelise Riles shows how contemporary anthropological
insights into the character of cultural difference and cultural fragmentation can
reframe conflict-of-laws analysis in productive ways.61 Taking up the example of
the treatment of Native American sovereignty in U.S. courts, she argues that a
theory of conflict of laws as a discipline devoted to addressing the problem of
cultural conflict is more doctrinally illuminating than the mainstream view of
conflict of laws as political conflict. Rethinking these cultural conflicts through
the prism of recent anthropological insights about culture as a problem of
empathetic description and collaborative engagement with others, moreover,
both reveals the importance of conflicts as a field and draws attention to aspects
of the field’s methodology, such as the description of foreign law, that are given
too little attention in mainstream analyses.
Karen Knop develops private international law as the private side of
citizenship.62 She shows that although we ordinarily think of citizenship as
public, private international law covers some of the same ground. Private
international law also harks back to a historical conception of the legal citizen
57. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE: LEGAL REASON IN THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS (forthcoming 2008).
58. Fleur Johns, Performing Party Autonomy, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243 (Summer 2008).
59. For another such blend, see Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate
Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411, 416–20 (2005)
(giving an insider perspective on a corporation’s decision regarding governing law in a contract).
60. Annelise Riles, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the
Legitimacy of the State, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2008).
61. Riles, supra note 38.
62. Knop, supra note 33.

INTRODUCTION_BOOK PROOF_FINAL2.DOC

16

10/27/2008 12:34:54 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 71:1

as someone who could sue and be sued, and someone who belonged to a
community of shared or common law that was not necessarily a territorial
community. Knop demonstrates that Anglo-Canadian private international law
has particular value as private citizenship in a post-9/11 world because its
treatment of enemy aliens, illegal immigrants, and members of religious
immigrant groups and other minorities offers us examples of actually existing
cosmopolitanism within the common law. Related to Riles’s article, she
proposes that the value of private international law for citizenship lies in its
store of technicalities through which we can think about cosmopolitanism on
the public side of citizenship as well. As Marianne Constable points out from
the perspective of political theory in her afterword, the uses of conflicts in
modern national and transnational politics is an example of the way law is now
often prior to politics—how it not only responds to, but creates the allegiances
and the divisions of the contemporary world. And yet the straddling of insider
and outsider perspectives advocated in this issue also usefully keeps an
awareness of the precise limits of doctrine and technicalities—of what law
perhaps cannot achieve. Constable argues that what conflicts ultimately cannot
achieve, despite its many uses, stems from the failure of all technocratic law: it
“fails at reconciling . . . ‘is and ought.’”
III
CONCLUSION: BEYOND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
Cavers’s ambition for this journal was that it could “become a medium for
that correlation of the law with other social sciences concerning which so much
is being said everywhere and so little is being done anywhere.”63 In many ways,
this plea for interdisciplinarity has still not been fully heeded, at least as regards
the conflict of laws. At the same time, Cavers’s plea arguably did not go far
enough. Although the social sciences, on which he focused, are not ignored in
this volume, many of the essays instead invoke the humanities and their
methods and theoretical approaches to bear upon conflict-of-laws problems.
This interdisciplinarity demonstrates and informs how conflict of laws, long
chided as overly technical, utilizes this very technicality to address some of the
biggest problems the law faces today, such as the character of sovereignty, the
nature of legitimacy in situations of exceptional political conflict, the problem
of the accommodation of cultural and political difference, the relationship
between minorities and majorities, the relative nature of any singular set of
values, the impact of diasporic communities on the authority of the nation-state,
the role of state and power in defining subjects and communities, the
relationship between global communities and local markets, or between local
communities and global market forces, and, perhaps most generally, the global
fragmentation and proliferation of systems of politics and values.

63. Cavers, supra note 2, at 168.
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Much of the potential of interdisciplinarity has so far remained untapped;
much still needs to be done. In this sense, the conclusion to this introduction
can be no more than an overture—to the articles in this symposium issue, but
also to further research and debate. Our hope is that over and above a number
of individual studies, this volume showcases what is possible, both for choice of
law and for other, extralegal, disciplines.

